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Abstract
This paper deals with the determinants of agents’ acquisition of infor-
mation. Our econometric evidence shows that the general index of Italian
share-prices and the series of Italy’s ﬁnancial newspaper sales are coin-
tegrated, and the former series Granger-causes the latter, thereby giving
support to the cognitive dissonance hypothesis: agents tend to buy the
newspaper when share prices are high and not to buy it when share prices
a r el o w .I n s t e a d ,w ed on o tﬁnd support for the hypothesis that the agents
acquire information in order to trade in the stock-market: we ﬁnd no re-
lationship between quantities exchanged in the market and newspaper
sales.
∗We are grateful to Armando Carcaterra, Claudio Mazzoli (Brainpower) and Hammad
Nasar for their help with Italian stock-market data, to Sibilla Guzzetti (ADS) for help with
the newspapers sales data, and to Antonio Cabrales, Juan Carrillo, Stefano DellaVigna, Luigi
Guiso, Elisabetta Iossa, Bruno Jullien, Gregor Langus, Annamaria Lusardi, Ludovic Renou,
Karl Schlag, and seminar participants at the EUI, Florence for useful discussions.
†University of Bologna. Address: Department of Economics, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126
Bologna.
‡European University Institute, Florence. Address: EUI, Department of Economics, Via
della Piazzuola 43, I-50133 Firenze.
§European University Institute, Florence and Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Ad-
dress: EUI, Department of Economics, Via della Piazzuola 43, I-50133 Firenze. E-mail:
massimo.motta@iue.it.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In ‘standard’ economic theory, an agent will normally be better oﬀ by hav-
ing more information, if the latter was free.1 This is because utility depends
on outcomes, and information (if it has any relevance) should help an agent
take better decisions, in turn improving outcomes. In recent years, however, a
growing literature has integrated psychology into economics, suggesting various
reasons why agents might want not to acquire available information. Diﬀerent
ways to model this phenomenon have been proposed, including strategic behav-
ior by agents, as well as the incorporation of beliefs in the utility function of
individuals (see Brocas and Carrillo, 2003: ch.5 for a review; some works are
also discussed below).
This paper tries to investigate empirically this question: when people decide
on information acquisition, to what extent are they driven by traditional eco-
nomic motives (i.e., improve their decision-making) as opposed to psychological
considerations?
We study this question by looking at the relationship between the acquisition
of information about ﬁnancial markets - in the particular form of the purchases
of Italy’s main ﬁnancial newspaper, Il Sole 24Ore - and data on the evolution
of the Italian stock exchange market.
There are two possible competing hypotheses that one could formulate when
speculating on the impact of the evolution of the stock exchange on the ﬁnancial
newspaper sales. The ﬁrst one is consistent with a neoclassical view of agents:
agents buy newspapers to acquire information about the stock market, in order
to improve their trading in the market (the newspaper may contain unexpected
news about ﬁrms or economic fundamentals), or reoptimise their portfolio (the
newspaper may report detailed information about share prices, useful to better
1The idea that in single-person decision problems agents prefer more information to less
was formalized by Blackwell (1951, 1953). This may not be the case in a multiple-agent setting
(see Hirshleifer, 1971). In game theory, there are many situations in which players are worse
oﬀ with more information (see also Osborne, 2004 p. 283 for examples). However, Bassan et
al. (2003) derive conditions under which information has a positive value in a game-theoretical
setting. Anyway, since we consider the behavior of individual investors, the game-theoretical
framework does not apply very well to our setting.
1calculate own portfolio allocation). According to this view, one should expect to
ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial newspaper sales increase with the volumes traded in the
market.2 The idea that more informed individuals trade more is an implication
of rational models on the determinants of investment in ﬁnancial information.
For example, in Peress (2004)’s model, information is more valuable to agents
with a riskier portfolio (who are also wealthier investors). These agents therefore
acquire more information, which increases the precision of their signal. In turn,
a higher precision induces more informed agents to hold more stocks.3 Another
prediction of the rational model is that the proportion of informed individuals
increases with price noise (see for example Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). This
is due to the fact that the higher the level of noise, the less informative the price
system is, and therefore the more valuable information is to traders.
The second hypothesis is instead based upon psychological considerations,
and in particular we refer to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957),
very inﬂuential in social psychology, and supported by a number of anecdotal
and experimental ﬁndings, in very diﬀerent domains and contexts.4 This theory
postulates that two cognitions (or elements of knowledge) are dissonant if the
opposite of one cognition follows from the other. Dissonance makes an agent
uncomfortable, and in order to reduce it the agent may either avoid any in-
formation likely to create dissonance or to process the available information so
as to reduce dissonance. In our context, an agent who learns that the price of
the shares she holds decreases will experience dissonance: the cognition that a
share is ‘doing badly’ is dissonant with the cognition that she holds that share
in her portfolio. In order to reduce dissonance the agent can keep her behav-
2The fact that more infomation is collected by investors does not necessarily imply that
more trade will follow (for instance, because information may just suggest that it is optimal
not to trade). However, under a neoclassical hypothesis one should presume that if the volume
of trade in the market increases, investors should have previously collected all the available
information.
3Guiso and Jappelli (2005) propose an alternative model which yields the same prediction
as the rational model, i.e. more informed agents trade more. However, in their model, the
driving force is a behavioral motivation: agents are overconﬁdent about the quality of the
information, and therefore trade more in response to the information collected.
4Two economics papers which report some of the seminal experiments and evidence on
cognitive dissonance and the related phenomenon of conﬁrmatory bias are Rabin (1998) and
Yariv (2002).
2ior unchanged (i.e., continue to hold the share) while eliminating the dissonant
knowledge by ignoring information about the share price. Therefore, at an
aggregate level this theory suggests that agents acquire information when the
share-price index increases (that is, they buy the ﬁnancial newspaper when they
expect to see that the particular shares they hold are doing well), but prefer to
ignore information when the share-price index decreases (that is, they do not
buy the newspaper when they expect to learn from it that their shares are not
doing well).5
By using cointegration techniques, we ﬁnd that our data (we have monthly
observations from 1978 to 2003) lend support to the second - cognitive disso-
nance - hypothesis but not to the ﬁrst one. In our data, the share-price series
and the series of the ﬁnancial newspaper sales are cointegrated (i.e., they move
together), while the series of the volumes traded in the Italian stock exchange
i sn o tc o i n t e g r a t e dw i t ht h eﬁnancial newspaper sales. Moreover, our results
suggest that the direction of causality (in the sense of Granger, 1969) goes
from the stock price index to the ﬁnancial newspaper sales (as expected),6 and
that there is no causality link between quantities of shares traded and newspa-
per sales. We also ﬁnd no evidence of a causal relation between stock market
volatility and newspaper sales, which contradicts the rational explanation of
information acquisition in ﬁnancial markets. This result is therefore consistent
5There is also another way in which the dissonance could be reduced if negative news on
the share-price index appear, and this is to sell their shares. However, this remedy to disso-
nance is certainly more costly (selling shares would entail a transaction cost, plus the agent
should take another decision on how to invest the money realized from the sale) than simply
ignoring information (note also that information here is costly: not buying the newspaper
entails a saving). Furthermore, this behaviour would also contrast with prospect theory (itself
supported by some empirical evidence): people tend to hold on their shares when they are
doing badly (with respect to some benchmark). This behaviour, known in the ﬁnance litera-
ture as the “disposition eﬀect”, is a well documented empirical regularity (see Odean, 1998,
and the subsequent literature).
6We posit here (and ﬁnd) a casual link from asset prices to newspaper sales. Dyck and
Zingales (2003) analyze a somewhat opposite causal link, by asking whether media coverage
aﬀect asset prices. However, what could aﬀect stock-exchange performance are particular news
about companies and sectors (for instance, expectation and announcements of earnings, news
about demand and cost evolution). It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a reason why the number of copies
sold of a ﬁnancial newspaper should aﬀect positively the stockmarket prices. There may be
of course events that both increase sales of the newspaper(s) and aﬀect the stock-exchange
prices, but one can reasonably expect that some of these events will negatively aﬀect prices,
while others will positively aﬀect them.
3with the hypothesis that the demand for ﬁnancial information depends on the
trend of asset prices.
In order to show that our results are not due to an omitted factor which
drives both the stock market and newspaper sales, we also explore the rela-
tionship between sports newspaper sales and the stock market index. We ﬁnd
no evidence of cointegration between these variables, nor evidence of a causal
relation between them. This supports the idea that there is no spurious correla-
tion between the newspaper sales and the stock market index, lending therefore
support to our behavioral explanation.
Our paper is related to the recent and fertile literature on economics and psy-
chology.7 More particularly, a number of distinct models have been developed
which are able to explain biases in the acquisition of information.8
Among the more recent contributions,9 Rabin and Schrag (1999) explain
the existence of distortions in agents’ information through cognitive mistakes,
and Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) explain ‘anomalous’ attitudes to information
through strategic decisions of agents, who choose to be ignorant in order to
discipline their future behavior.10
A third approach explains cognitive dissonance by assuming that the agent’s
beliefs enter directly her expected-utility function. This approach has been pio-
neered by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and recent contributions include Köszegi
(2000), Eliaz and Spiegler (2003), Yariv (2002).11 In this approach, information
can be used by agents to improve their decisions, but it can also aﬀect their
beliefs. An agent who maximizes a standard expected-utility function would
n o tr e f u s et oh a v ef r e ei n f o r m a t i o nb e c a u s et h i sw o u l da l l o wh e rt ot a k e‘ b e t t e r ’
decisions, but an agent whose beliefs enter her expected-utility function may
7See for instance Rabin (1998, 2002), Brocas and Carrillo (2003, 2004), and Camerer,
Loewenstein and Rabin (2004).
8It is not surprising that the same phenomenon is explained by distinct approaches, since
the theory of cognitive dissonance has given rise to a large variety of interpretations and ap-
plications. See Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) for a review of the social psychology literature.
9See Akerlof and Dickens (1982) for the ﬁrst formalization of cognitive dissonance within
an economic model.
10See also Benabou and Tirole (2002).
11In all of these papers, beliefs enter directly the utility function of the agent, but in some
works beliefs are treated as a choice variable, while others treat them as parameters.
4decide to ignore information (or to re-interpret it) so as to preserve her beliefs.
‘Anomalous’ behavior with respect to information follows from the type of be-
liefs that the agent has. For instance, if the agent has a preference for consistent
beliefs, her utility increases when her beliefs are conﬁrmed, and decreases when
they are invalidated: the agent may want to actively acquire information of the
former type, and to ignore (or manipulate) information which leads to the lat-
ter situation. Or, if the agent’s utility increases with the belief the agent holds
about herself, the agent may want to ignore any information which would lead
her to revise downwards the judgment of her abilities.
Although we do not venture into a theoretical model of our ﬁndings, we
speculate that the third approach might naturally lead to agents’ behavior con-
sistent with our empirical ﬁndings. Suppose that an agent’s expected utility
includes not only the performance of the assets she holds, but also her beliefs on
her abilities as an investor. Then, our agent should be eager to acquire positive
news about the performance of her assets and would instead prefer not to see
the negative news. In other words, she would buy the ﬁnancial newspaper in
times of high share prices and not buy it in times of low share prices.12
In this stream of the literature, Karlsson et al. (2004) present a model
of belief manipulation. When facing a changing environment, agents choose
between two psychological states: they can be either attentive and actively
seek information, or inattentive and avoid information.13 The authors ﬁnd that
for some parameter values their model gives rise to what they term ‘ostrich
eﬀect’ (and we call cognitive dissonance): in ‘bad times’, individuals choose to
12Implicitly, this story assumes that the agent knows if the newspaper reports high or low
prices for her shares. This might be formalized in two distinct ways. A ﬁrst possibility - that
we prefer - is that the agent is exposed to some rumour about the general price level, but it is
only after buying a newspaper that she will have precise information on her shares (see also
Karlsson et al., 2004 for a similar justiﬁcation). A second possibility is that if share prices
are correlated over time (as it is argued by the ﬁnancial literature on ‘mean reversion’, see
for instance Fama and French, 1988) then the agent may buy the newspaper for one or more
days, but after having observed a drop in the asset prices would not buy any longer for some
time after, since she expects it would still report low prices.
13By actively seeking or not information, individuals also choose how intensely they experi-
e n c ec h a n g e s ,w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀect their benchmark for future utility: deviations of outcomes
from a pre-speciﬁed benchmark is an important element of their model, which incorporates
the main insight from prospect theory.
5be inattentive (and put their heads in the sand like ostriches), while in ‘good
times’ they choose to be attentive.
What makes their paper similar to ours is that they also investigate this
question empirically by looking at share prices data, and ﬁnd evidence that
investors tend to check the value of their portfolio (i.e., to login their accounts)
more frequently when stock exchange prices increase than when they decrease.
There are two main diﬀerences between Karlsson et al. (2004) and the
present paper. Firstly, we do not limit ourselves to investigating whether the
data support the ‘cognitive dissonance’ (or ‘ostrich behavior’) hypothesis, but
we also investigate the competing hypothesis, according to which information is
acquired in order to improve decision-making (and - as anticipated above - we
cannot reject the former while the data reject the latter). Secondly, we make
use of diﬀerent econometric methods. They have daily data for a relatively
short period of time, and they limit themselves to simply regress the numbers
of daily logins on the relevant share price indices; instead, we have less disag-
gregated (monthly sales) but much longer (26 years) series of data, and we use
more sophisticated econometric techniques which also allow us to investigate
the causality link between the variables at issue.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data; section
3 presents our econometric methodology and results; section 4 concludes.
2 Discussion of the data
We use average monthly values from 1978 to 2003 for the Datastream price index
of the Italian stock market. This index is built by taking the ﬁrst 90% of all
the companies quoted on the Italian stock exchange taken in decreasing order
of capitalization, disregarding in this way the small companies. The trading
volumes corresponding to the Datastream stock price index are only available
from 1986 to date (we use total monthly volumes).
As to the sources of information on the ﬁnancial market, we use data on the
6sales of Il Sole 24Ore, which is by far the largest ﬁnancial (daily) newspaper.14
The Italian market for ﬁnancial newspapers is essentially composed of three
titles: Il Sole 24Ore, Italia Oggi,a n dMF.15 However, Italia Oggi and MF have
a much lower circulation with respect to Il Sole 24Ore, which has historically
always been the Italian ﬁnancial newspaper and accounts for over 90% of this
market.16 Therefore we only consider the sales of Il Sole 24Ore for the purpose
of our analysis. In particular, consistently with the stock market data, we use
monthly average sales from 1978 to 2003.17
It could reasonably be argued that a ﬁnancial newspaper is not the only
way to acquire information on the stock market. Other ﬁnancial publications,
national newspapers, and internet services could to some extent be substitute
channels of information acquisition with respect to Il Sole 24Ore. However,
there are good reasons to think that these alternative information sources are
not crucial for the purposes of our analysis.18 First of all, national newspapers of
general information do not seem to be close substitutes for Il Sole 24Ore, because
of their lower coverage and level of in-depth analyses on ﬁnancial information.
With the advent of internet, online news have become an alternative chan-
nel with respect to written publications. However, since our data go back to
14The source of these data is the ADS (Accertamenti Diﬀusione Stampa) dataset, which is
publicly available (on paper) since 1976. ADS collects and certiﬁes the publishers’ declarations
on the number of copies sold and printed and on the number of subscriptions.
15There are also two minor publications whose circulation is negligible (see ﬁgures quoted
in two decisions of the Italian competition agency, Provv. n. 3336 Class Editori / Il Sole 24
Ore (19/10/1995) and Provv. n. 4822 Italia Oggi Editori / Il Sole 24 Ore (27/3/1997)).
16Italia Oggi and MF were founded in 1986 and 1989 respectively, so they were not present
on the market in the ﬁr s tp a r to fo u rs a m p l ep e r i o d . S i n c eMF is not present on the ADS
dataset (because they chose not to report their data to this agency), the information available
on this publication amounts to the ﬁgures provided by the Italian antitrust competition agency
in two decisions (Provv. n. 3336 Class Editori / Il Sole 24Ore (19/10/1995) and Provv. n.
4822 Italia Oggi Editori / Il Sole 24Ore (27/3/1997)), according to which MF had a share
of 2-3% in 1993 and in 1995. As to Italia Oggi, its market share was on average 6-7% over
the whole period. Therefore Il Sole 24Ore had a market share of around 90% or higher in the
period under consideration.
17We use sales instead of total circulation because the latter includes also subscriptions,
which are not a variable of interest for the purposes of our analysis. (In Italy, subscriptions
account for a very small part of newspapers sales anyway.) Daily observations are not available
in our dataset, and in any case they would probably not be suitable for the purpose of our
econometric analysis, since they would add much more noise to our series.
18The view that the market for daily ﬁnancial newspapers can be deﬁned as a separate
market is taken also by the Italian competition agency in the two above-mentioned decisions.
71978, internet was not even existing or widespread for most of the period under
consideration. The development of internet access is a relatively recent phenom-
enon in Italy, and internet usage was fairly limited even until 5 years ago.19,20 In
the next Section, we also perform the econometric analysis on a reduced sample
w h e r ew eh a v ed e l e t e dt h el a s tt h r e ey e ars of observations, in order to elimi-
nate the period where internet started to be an alternative source of ﬁnancial
information.
Another source of information on ﬁnancial markets is provided by private
agencies (e.g. Reuters or Bloomberg) which charge a subscription fee for their
service. Therefore they are generally targeted to professional investors who need
to have constant and detailed information about instantaneous variations in the
stock prices. The target readership of a ﬁnancial newspaper like Il Sole 24Ore is
instead mainly composed of individual investors who want to ﬁnd more detailed
information about the ﬁnancial assets they hold, obtain relevant news, and read
experts’ analyses. Since individual, non-professional investors are more likely
to exhibit a ‘cognitive dissonant’ behavior, we focus therefore on Il Sole 24Ore,
which is probably the main source of information for this type of investors.21
In order to get a ﬁrst glance on the data, in Figure 1 below we plot the series
of (log) sales of Il Sole 24Ore against the series of the (log) Datastream index.
In Figure 2 below we plot instead the series of (log) sales of Il Sole 24Ore against
the series of the (log) Datastream trading volumes. In order to interpret the
increasing trend of the stock market variables, it should be taken into account
that the Italian stock exchange has grown considerably in the 1980s and even
more in the 1990s. Mutual funds were introduced in 1983, but it is only from
19The share of internet users over the total population was around 1% in 1997, and started
to increase sharply only after the year 2000, when it reached 22% of the population (source:
Computer Industry Almanac). However, high-speed connections are not widespread even
nowadays, and prices for internet access still limit the frequency of usage.
20Furthermore, even if individual investors can ﬁnd free information about the general
performance of the stock market in many websites, there are several reasons why printed
media still provide a valuable service (see Dyck and Zingales, 2003). They include credibility
of information as well as sound and in-depth analyses of the determinants and prospects of
stock exchange performance.
21Moreover, we do not consider subscriptions in our analysis, in order to avoid capturing
the behavior of professional investors (who typically get access to Il Sole 24Ore through
subscription).
8the second half of the 1980s that they started to become a widely held ﬁnancial
instrument. Household participation in equity markets increased from 26.43%
in 1985 to 38.19% in 1995 and to 48.24% in 1998 (source: Pelizzon and Weber,
2004, based on information from a Bank of Italy SHIW survey).
A ﬁrst look at the rough data series seems to conﬁrm the results that we
illustrate in the next section: these graphs suggest that there is some kind of
relation between the sales of Il Sole 24Ore and the stock market index, whereas
there does not seem to be any clear relationship between Il Sole 24Ore and the
trading volumes. The investigation of the existence and the direction of these
relationships is the object of the next section.
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Figure 1: Sales of Il Sole 24Ore and stock market index (Note: the scale for
Sole is on the left axis and the scale for the index is on the right axis).
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Figure 2: Sales of Il Sole 24Ore and stock market volumes (Note: the scale for
Sole is on the right axis and the scale for the volumes is on the left axis).
3 Econometric Methodology and Results
As explained earlier, the focus of interest is the relation between the Sole 24Ore
sales and, alternatively, the stock price index or the stock market volume. First,
we perform a cointegration analysis. This is important because if two variables
are cointegrated then they are trending together (are driven by the same sto-
chastic trend) and hence there is a strong relation between them. Indeed, it
can be shown that two cointegrated variables must be Granger-causally related
at least in one direction. Then, we carry out Granger-causality tests based
on VAR processes, in order to investigate the direction of causality (Granger,
1969).22
Since our methods depend on the unit root or integration and cointegration
properties of the variables, we ﬁrst perform unit root tests. We ﬁnd support for
22Two time series variables x and y are Granger-causally related if one variable contains
information for improving the forecasts of the other variable. More precisely, x is Granger-
causal for y if the forecasts of y can be improved by taking into account past and present
information in x.
10Table 1: Johansen Trace Tests for one Cointegration Relation
variables deterministic VAR lag value of p-value
(sample period) terms order test stat.
log Sole/log index orth. trend, sd 2 15.27 0.05
(1978M1-2003M12, T = 312) orth. trend, sd 5 16.36 0.04
orth. trend, sd 6 14.09 0.08
log Sole/log volume orth. trend, sd 2 17.15 0.03
(1986M7-2003M12, T = 210) orth. trend, sd 5 9.75 0.31
log index/log volume orth. trend, sd 2 10.33 0.26
(1986M7-2003M12, T = 210)
Notes: sd - seasonal dummies.
classifying all three variables as integrated of order one (I(1)), suggesting that
all three variables have a stochastic trend (see Appendix for a discussion of the
unit root properties of the variables).
Cointegration is explored with Johansen’s likelihood ratio trace tests (Jo-
hansen, 1995). These tests check the number of cointegration relations in a
VAR framework and use the full information in all the time series involved.
Since only two I(1) variables are considered, the only null hypothesis of interest
is no cointegration relation between them. If that hypothesis is rejected, we
conclude that there is a cointegration relation.23
The results are given in Table 1 and they suggest a cointegration relation
between (log) Sole 24Ore sales (“log Sole”) and the (log) stock market price
index (“log index”). We are using diﬀerent lag orders in the tests because
the test results are known to be sensitive to the number of lags included in
the underlying VAR model.24 For all three lag orders reported in Table 1, a
cointegration rank of zero and, hence, the lack of cointegration can be rejected
at least at the 10% level for the log Sole/log index system. Given that an
23The tests are based on a model where no deterministic linear trend is allowed in the
cointegration relation, that is, the linear trend (if it exists) is orthogonal to the cointegration
relation. Notice that the variables may still have a linear trend individually.
24Our choice of the lag orders is based on the three standard model selection criteria AIC,
HQ and SC (e.g., Lütkepohl, 2004b, Section 3.4).
11excessively large lag order tends to reduce the power of the tests, the fact that
the largest p-value is associated with the largest lag order is not surprising.
Therefore there is evidence of a cointegration relation between the Sole sales
and the stock market index, which is consistent with the “cognitive dissonance”
hypothesis.
The results reported in Table 1 do not suggest instead the existence of coin-
tegration between newspaper sales (“log Sole”) and traded volumes (“log vol-
ume”). The test results for these two variables depend strongly on the lag order
chosen and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected at common
signiﬁcance levels for lag order 5.
Note also that an important implication of a cointegration relation between
the two pairs of variables. If both the stock price index and the volume were
cointegrated with the newspaper sales, then they must necessarily also be coin-
tegrated with each other (e.g., Lütkepohl, 2005, Section 6.3). Therefore coin-
tegration between log index and log volume is also checked in Table 1 where
it is seen that the rank zero hypothesis cannot be rejected. This implies that
there exists no cointegration relation between the Sole sales and the stock market
volume.
Since cointegration is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition for Granger-
causality, we next investigate the direction of causality between the variables
using Wald tests for Granger-causality.25 Test results based on VAR models with
diﬀerent lag orders and an intercept term as well as seasonal dummy variables
as deterministic terms are presented in Table 2.26,27 These test results present a
25If cointegrated variables are involved, standard Wald tests (F-tests) for Granger-causality
are problematic in general (Toda and Phillips, 1993). In the present situation it can be shown,
however, that they have their usual asymptotic χ2-o ra p p r o x i m a t eF-distributions. The log
Sole/log index system is one with two I(1) variables and one cointegration relation for which
the Wald statistic for Granger-causality has standard properties (see Toda and Phillips, 1993
and Lütkepohl and Reimers, 1992). The second system (log Sole/log volume) consists of two
I(1) variables which are not cointegrated. Hence, a stationary VAR in ﬁrst diﬀerences may
be considered and used as the basis for Granger-causality tests. In stationary VARs the usual
Wald tests are known to have standard asymptotic properties, however (Lütkepohl, 2005,
Section 3.6).
26The lag orders are again chosen by the three most common criteria in applied work (AIC,
HQ, SC).
27Here the F-version of the Wald test is applied which corrects at least partly for the
undesirable small sample properties of the usual χ2-version (Lütkepohl, 2005, Section 3.6).
12Table 2: Causality Tests Based on VAR Models in Levels or First Diﬀerences
as Appropriate with p Lags, Sample Periods as in Table 1
Granger instantaneous
p H0 causality relation
6 log index 6→ log Sole 2.48 (0.02) 3.37 (0.07)
5 log index 6→ log Sole 3.13 (0.01) 3.35 (0.07)
2 log index 6→ log Sole 3.87 (0.02) 2.34 (0.13)
1 ∆ log DSvolume 6→ ∆ log SOLE 0.04 (0.85) 1.00 (0.32)
4 ∆ log DSvolume 6→ ∆ log SOLE 1.84 (0.12) 2.80 (0.09)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
strong case in favor of a Granger-causal relation from the log stock market index
to the log Sole sales while no such relation is found for log volume and log Sole.28
More precisely, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality from log index to
log Sole (log index 6→ log Sole) is clearly rejected at common signiﬁcance levels.
In contrast, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality from the log volume
to log Sole cannot be rejected at usual signiﬁcance levels. Overall these results
favor the cognitive dissonance hypothesis and do not support the neoclassical
hypothesis.
In Table 2 we also present results of tests for what is usually called instan-
taneous causality in the literature, and may be viewed as a measure for the
instantaneous relation between the two variables when all intertemporal rela-
tions have been accounted for. The Table shows that there is at most a weak
instantaneous relation between the variables (one would not reject the null hy-
pothesis of no instantaneous causality at the 5% level of signiﬁcance). Thus,
the results of the instantaneous causality tests are consistent with the previous
conclusion in favor of the cognitive dissonance hypothesis.
To check the robustness of our results, we have also deleted the data asso-
ciated with the last three years of our sample and we have repeated the tests.
By deleting the data after the year 2000 eliminates much of the long lasting
28We have also checked that the existence of the inverse causality relationships is not con-
ﬁr m e db yt h ed a t a( s e eA p p e n d i x ) .
13Table 3: Causality Tests Based on VAR Models in Levels or First Diﬀerences
as Appropriate with p Lags, Sample Terminated in 2000M12
Granger
p H0 causality
6 log index 6→ log Sole 3.19 (0.00)
5 log index 6→ log Sole 3.88 (0.00)
2 log index 6→ log Sole 6.94 (0.00)
1 ∆ log volume 6→ ∆ log Sole 0.19 (0.66)
4 ∆ log volume 6→ ∆ log Sole 0.45 (0.77)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
downward movement in the stock market which some may regard as an unusual
period. Moreover, the past few years also coincide with the advent of internet
websites as an alternative source of ﬁnancial information, which may weaken
the relationship between stock market variables and Sole 24Ore sales. The re-
sults for the reduced sample are shown in Table 3. With respect to the results
for the full sample, they show even stronger evidence of a causality relationship
between the stock market index and Sole 24Ore sales, and of the absence of a
causality relationship between volumes and Sole 24Ore sales.
In summary, the empirical analysis produces support for the cognitive dis-
sonance hypothesis whereas it lends little support for the neoclassical view of
information acquisition.
We have also performed a battery of robustness checks which are reported
in the Appendix. In particular, we ﬁnd no evidence of the existence of inverse
causality relations between the variables. We have also performed lag augmenta-
tion tests à la Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996), whose results conﬁrm our ﬁndings.
Finally, we show results of causality tests for the levels VAR models for the
log Sole/log index system with a deterministic linear trend term in addition
to seasonal dummy variables. Again they conﬁrm the results obtained with a
constant and seasonal dummies only.
As we have said in the Introduction, some neoclassical models predict that
the greater the magnitude of the noise in the stock market index, the higher
14the incentive to acquire information. In the Appendix, we show that there is
no evidence of a causal relation between stock market volatility and newspaper
sales.
One could argue that our ﬁnding of a relationship between the stock mar-
ket index and the ﬁnancial newspaper sales may be due to an omitted factor
rather than to the cognitive dissonance explanation. For example, one could
think that when the stock market goes up, people feel richer and increase their
consumption, including the purchase of any type of newspaper. If this is the
case, we should therefore ﬁnd a relationship between the stock market index
and the sales of non-ﬁnancial newspapers. We then perform a cointegration
analysis between the stock price index and the sales of Italian sports newspa-
pers (which are probably the class of newspapers more distant from the ﬁnancial
ones), whose details are shown in the Appendix. Our analysis show that there
is no evidence of cointegration between these variables, nor evidence of a causal
relation between them. This supports the idea that there is no spurious correla-
tion between the newspaper sales and the stock market index, which somewhat
lends more support to the behavioral explanation.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have tested two alternative predictions about agents’ attitude
toward information acquisition. On the one hand, according to ‘standard’ eco-
nomic theory, agents should be eager to search for (relevant) information in
order to improve their decision-making. On the other hand, the growing litera-
ture on behavioral economics suggests that individuals may display a ‘cognitive
dissonant’ behavior by refusing to acquire available information which might
contrast with their maintained beliefs.
We analyze this issue by looking at the relationship between the stock market
and the demand for ﬁnancial information in Italy. If agents behave according
to standard economic theory, they should acquire information on the ﬁnancial
market for transactional reasons (for instance, with a view to reoptimise their
15portfolio allocation). Therefore we should expect to ﬁnd a relationship between
the volumes of transaction on the stock market and the demand for information
(that we measure in terms of sales of the main Italian ﬁnancial newspaper). If
instead agents’ behavior is driven by psychological considerations, we should
expect them to purchase the newspaper (and therefore to acquire information)
when the stock market performs well (because they are more likely to ﬁnd that
their shares are doing well) and not to purchase it when the stock market is in
a negative phase. Therefore according to this hypothesis we should ﬁnd that an
increase in the stock market price increases the sales of the ﬁnancial newspaper.
Our results support the ‘cognitive dissonance’ hypothesis rather than the
neoclassical hypothesis. A cointegration analysis on the series of the Italian
stock exchange price index and of the Italian main ﬁnancial newspaper’s cir-
culation shows that the two series are indeed cointegrated, whereas the series
of the stock market volumes and the newspaper’s sale are not. The relation-
ships of Granger-causality between the variables that are cointegrated has the
expected direction: we ﬁnd evidence of a causality relation that goes from the
stock market index to the sales of the newspaper, which is consistent with the
‘cognitive dissonance’ hypothesis.
Appendix
Unit root properties of the variables
Checking the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 one may at least not exclude the pos-
sibility of all three variables having a stochastic trend and, hence, being I(1).
We have used augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS tests (see Lütkepohl,
2004a, Section 2.7) to formally investigate the unit root properties of the vari-
ables. Some results are presented in Table 4 below.29 They suggest that all
three series may indeed be classiﬁed as I(1). ADF tests of the levels of all series
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root while KPSS tests of stationarity
clearly reject. Furthermore, ADF tests of the ﬁrst diﬀerences clearly reject a
29All computations were performed with the software JMulTi (Lütkepohl and Krätzig,
2004).
16unit root and thereby conﬁrm that higher order integration can be excluded.
Table 4: Unit Root Tests
variable sample period test deterministic lag value of
terms order test stat.
log Sole 1978M1-2003M12 ADF c, sd, t 4 −0.59
log Sole 1978M1-2003M12 KPSS c, t 12 0.55∗∗
∆log Sole 1978M2-2003M12 ADF c, sd 2 −12.0∗∗
log index 1978M1-2003M12 ADF c, t 3 −2.23
log index 1978M1-2003M12 ADF c 3 −2.38
log index 1978M1-2003M12 KPSS c, t 12 0.33∗∗
∆log index 1978M1-2003M12 ADF c 12 −3.89∗∗
log volume 1986M7-2003M12 ADF c, t 3 −2.44
log volume 1986M7-2003M12 ADF c 1 −1.28
log volume 1986M7-2003M12 KPSS c, t 12 0.23∗∗
∆log volume 1986M8-2003M12 ADF c 3 −19.1∗∗
Notes: c - constant, t - linear time trend, sd - seasonal dummies.
Asterisks
(∗),
∗ and
∗∗ indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Order selection for ADF test by HQ criterion with maximal lag 24.
Additional causality tests
We have also checked that the existence of the inverse causality relationships is
not conﬁrmed by the data. Table 5 shows that there is no evidence of a causality
direction going from log Sole to log index and from log Sole to log volumes.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have also used lag aug-
mentation tests à la Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) which are generally valid for
integrated and cointegrated systems. The results for the full sample period are
presented in Table 6 and they conﬁrm our more reﬁned ﬁndings. The advantage
of these tests is, however, that they would also be asymptotically valid if the
cointegration properties of the system were misspeciﬁed.
In Table 7 we also show results of causality tests for the levels VAR models
for the log Sole/log index system which include a deterministic linear trend
17Table 5: Causality Tests Based on VAR Models in Levels or First Diﬀerences
as Appropriate with p Lags, Sample Periods as in Table 1
Granger instantaneous
p H0 causality relation
6 log Sole 6→ log index 2.78 (0.01) 3.37 (0.07)
5 log Sole 6→ log index 1.53 (0.18) 3.35 (0.07)
2 log Sole 6→ log index 2.00 (0.14) 2.34 (0.13)
1 ∆ log SOLE 6→ ∆ log DSvolume 0.50 (0.48) 1.00 (0.32)
4 ∆ log SOLE 6→ ∆ log DSvolume 0,60 (0.66) 2.80 (0.09)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
term in addition to seasonal dummy variables. Again they conﬁrm our results
obtained with a constant and seasonal dummies only. Given the way the time
series look like, deterministic trend terms do not make much sense for models
in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Therefore we do not report such results.
Table 6: Lag Augmented Causality Tests, Sample Periods as in Table 1
Granger instantaneous
p H0 causality relation
2 log index 6→ log Sole 4.377 (0.01) 1.972 (0.16)
6 log index 6→ log Sole 2.548 (0.02) 3.444 (0.06)
2 log volume 6→ log Sole 0.013 (0.99) 1.954 (0.16)
6 log volume 6→ log Sole 1.475 (0.19) 3.322 (0.07)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Causality analysis for market volatility and newspaper sales
We have also performed Granger-causality tests for a series of squared, mean-
adjusted stock index returns and log Sole. More precisely, the new variable is
r2
t =( ∆log indext − ˆ µ)2,w h e r eˆ µ = T−1 PT
t=1 ∆log indext. T h i ss e r i e sm a y
be viewed as a measure of market volatility. The series does not have a unit
root and one could argue that checking Granger-causality between r2
t and the
changes in log Sole is preferable to using log Sole in levels. Therefore both types
of tests are reported in Table 8. Clearly, there is no evidence for a causal relation
18Table 7: Causality Tests Based on VAR Models in Levels with p Lags, Sample
Period as in Table 1
Granger instantaneous
p H0 causality relation
6 log index 6→ log Sole 2.41 (0.03) 3.44 (0.06)
5 log index 6→ log Sole 3.00 (0.01) 3.38 (0.07)
2 log index 6→ log Sole 3.86 (0.02) 2.34 (0.13)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
from market volatility to the log Sole sales.
Table 8: Causality Tests Based on VAR Models for Market Volatility and log
Sole, Sample Period 1978M2-2003M12, T = 311
Granger
p H0 causality
9 r
2 6→ log Sole 1.19 (0.30)
1 r
2 6→ log Sole 0.00 (1.00)
9 r
2 6→ ∆ log Sole 0.91 (0.52)
4 r
2 6→ ∆ log Sole 0.63 (0.64)
1 r
2 6→ ∆ log Sole 0.02 (0.90)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Causality analysis for sports newspaper sales and stock
market index
In analyzing the causal relation between the index and the sports newspaper
sales we have used only data from 1987 to 2003 because there are data problems
for the sports newspaper sales before 1987 (referred to as “Sports” and trans-
formed in logs). We consider the aggregated sales of the three Italian sports
newspapers which are available in our dataset (Corriere dello Sport, Gazzetta
dello Sport, Tuttosport).
Unit root tests support a single nonseasonal unit root in the series which
will therefore be treated as I(1). Thus it makes sense to consider cointegration
between log index and log Sports. The results of Johansen tests are given in Ta-
19Table 9: Johansen Trace Tests for one Cointegration Relation between log Sports
and log index (H0 : no cointegration)
variables deterministic VAR lag value of p-value
(sample period) terms order test stat.
log Sports/log index orth. trend, sd 2 6.95 0.59
(1987M1-2003M12, T = 204) orth. trend, sd 1 9.50 0.33
Notes: sd - seasonal dummies.
ble 9. No cointegration is found, that is, the null hypothesis of no cointegration
relation cannot be rejected.
Because cointegration is just a suﬃcient condition but not a necessary one
for Granger-causality, we have also performed causality tests based on a VAR
model for the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the two series. The results are presented in
Table 10. Clearly, there is no evidence for a causal relation in either direction.
These results support the idea that the relation between log index and log
Sole is not just spurious.
Table 10: Causality Tests Based on a VAR(1) Model for log index and log
Sports, Sample Period 1987M2-2003M12, T = 203
Granger
p H0 causality
1 ∆ log index 6→ ∆ log Sports 0.27 (0.60)
1 ∆ log Sports 6→ ∆ log index 0.26 (0.61)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
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